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COMMENTS 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
Amendments of 1978: Tension Between Congress 
and the Courts. 
During the fourteen years since the enactment of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),' tension 
has developed between Congress and the federal judiciary re- 
garding implementation of the Act. This tension is manifested 
by the differences between what Congress intended to promote 
and the narrower construction given the law by the federal 
courts. Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act Amendments of 1978 to clarify its intentions in several 
troublesome areas. But despite the Amendments' impact of set- 
ting forth decisive answers with respect to some issues, the scope 
of the Amendments was not so pervasive as to settle all contro- 
versies. Differences in breadth of interpretation continue to exist 
between Congress and the federal judiciary on a few significant 
issues concerning age discrimination protection. 
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The efforts of Congress to combat age discrimination date 
back to the early 1960's when it enacted laws to aid the elderly 
in employment.' These acts did not expressly forbid age discrim- 
ination, however, and an Executive order issued by President 
Johnson in 1964 only prohibited federal contractors and subcon- 
tractors from discriminating on the basis of age." Congress con- 
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). 
2. See Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. $5 3001-3056f (1976)); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 
Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2701-29961 (1976)); Manpower Development & Train- 
ing Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. $5 2571-2628 
(1976)). 
3. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. 3301 app., at 379 (1976). 
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sidered including age as a prohibited basis for discrimination in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964' but decided to wait until the Secre- 
tary of Labor could investigate and propose recommendations 
for specific age discrimination legislation.' The Secretary's sub- 
sequent report led to the passage of the ADEA in 1967? 
The ADEA's express purpose is "to promote employment of 
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit 
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help em- 
ployers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from 
the impact of age on employment."' The Act originally prohib- 
ited private employers with more than twenty-five employees 
from discriminating on the basis of age against prospective or 
current employees between forty and sixty-five years of age. In 
1974 the Act was extended to encompass the federal civil ser- 
vice, state and local governments, and private employers with 
more than twenty  employee^.^ The trend toward greater protec- 
tion of the elderly continued when Congress enacted the Older 
Americans Amendments of 1975@ to prohibit unreasonable dis- 
crimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiv- 
ing federal financial assistance. 
B. Court Enforcement 
Paradoxically, Congress' deliberate movement toward 
greater protection of the elderly against employment discrimina- 
tion has met noticeable opposition from segments of the federal 
judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The Court to date has 
decided two mandatory government retirement cases outside 
ADEA coverage,1° has ruled on four ADEA cases,ll and has de- 
nied certiorari in at least seven other ADEA actions.12 Of these 
4. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976). 
5. Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm 
Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1328 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Age 
Discrirnina tion]. 
6. Id. 
7. 29 U.S.C. 5 621(b) (1976). 
8. Id. 55 630(b), 633a. 
9. Pub. L. No. 94-135, 89 Stat. 713 (amending the Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. 55 3001-3056f (1976)). 
10. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 US. 307 (1976). 
11. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 
(1978); United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 
99 (1977), aff'g, 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). 
12. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 
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thirteen cases, two decisions do not lend themselves to being la- 
beled either pro- or anti-elderly,lS one granted relief to the 
plaintiff employee in a four-to-four decision without opinion," 
one protected the plaintiff employee,l5 and the other nine cases 
furthered the interests of the defendant employers.16 The con- 
clusion arguably to be derived from the holdings in these cases is 
that the Court has construed the ADEA and its amendments so 
narrowly that the broad age discrimination protection Congress 
intended for the elderly has not been fully realized. 
The divergent views taken by Congress and the Supreme 
Court have understandably provoked confusion and dissension 
(1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1066 (1977); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977); Z i e r  v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974); De Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F. 
Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 US. 1009 (1974). 
13. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 
(1978); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 102- 
04 infra). 
14. Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), aff'g 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976) 
(discussed in text accompanying notes 136-37 infra). 
15. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 966 (1977). See note 96 infra. 
16. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (resort to state remedies is 
mandatory); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (provision of Foreign Service Act of 
1946 requiring persons covered by Foreign Service retirement system to retire at age 60 
is not violative of equal protection concerns of due process clause of fifth amendment); 
United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (mandatory retirement of pre-age 65 
workers pursuant to terms of bona fide retirement plan came within exception to ADEA 
and was thus not a "subterfuge"); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307 (1976) (state statute mandating retirement of uniformed state police officers at  age 
50 does not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Dean v. American 
Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1977) (punitive 
damages and general damages for pain and suffering not allowed in private ADEA ac- 
tions); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1022 (1977) (damages for pain and suffering or emotional or psychic distress not 
allowed in ADEA suits); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1008 (1977) (forced early retirement pursuant to bona fide pension plan not viola- 
tive of ADEA); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 449 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1122 (1974) (defendant employer which raised bona fide occupational qualifica- 
tion defense successfully carried its burden in showing that it had a rational basis in fact 
to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring-age policy would increase the likeli- 
hood of risk of harm to passengers); De Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F. Supp. 
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (even 
if pension trust in question was covered under ADEA, the pension trust's conduct with 
respect to plaintiff was within the exemption to Act that permits labor organizations to 
observe terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan). 
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among the lower federal courts. In over one hundred ADEA 
cases brought in the lower federal courts, splits among the cir- 
cuits have developed-and in some cases continue to exist-on 
almost every major issue.'? The splits among the circuits have 
not arisen solely because of Congress' and the Supreme Court's 
conflicting views; rather, the confusion also stems from the fact 
that the ADEA is a hybrid of the Civil Rights Act, the Fair La- 
bor Standards Act, and, to a lesser extent, the National Labor 
17. 
Table I. Congress and the Courts 
ISSUES CONGRESS 
1. Mandatory 
Government 
Retirement 
2. Pension Plan 
Forced 
Retirement 
NO: with some 
exceptions: 1974 
Amendment, 1978 
Amendment 
NO: 1978 Amendment 
3. Lenient 
BFoQ 
Standard 
YES: 1978 Comment 
4. Jury 
Trial 
Available 
YES: 1978 Amendment 
5. Punitive 
Damages 
Avaiable 
NO: 1978 Comment 
6. Damages for 
Pain and 
Suffering 
' 8. Federal 
Conciliation 
Jurisdictional 
7. 180 Days 
Jurisdictional 
NO: 1978 Comment 
NO: 1978 Comment 
9. State Remedy 
Exhaustion 
Jurisdictional 
NO: 1978 Comment 
SUPREME COURT CIR- 
CUITS 
Brad ley 
denied in 
YES: 1977 McMann 
YES: 1978 Lorillard YES: 4 
NO: 3 
YES: 7 
NO: 1 
NO: 1978 cert. denied 
in Dean 
NO: 2 l m 4  
YES: 0 
NO: 6 
NO: 1978 cert. denied 
in Dean, 1977 
cert. denied in 
Rogers 
NO: 1977 Dartt 
I 
YES: 1979 Evans 
NO: 6 
YES: 0 
NO: 8 
YES:3 
NO: 4 
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Relations Act.18 Inconsistent results are inevitable when the va- 
rying legal standards of these three acts are grafted into the 
ADEA setting without the benefit of a principled, uniform ap- 
proach. Thus, some circuits appear to be more inclined toward 
Congress' pro-elderly approach, and others appear to subscribe 
to the Supreme Court's less accommodating view toward the 
elderly.'@ However, the correlation is far from perfect and the 
relative mix of causal factors may be difficult to pinpoint. 
C. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments 
of 1978 
The adoption of the Age Discrimination in Employment A d  
Amendments of 1978 (1978  amendment^)^^ can be traced to at  
least two driving forces. First, numerous hearings conducted by 
the House Select Committee on Aging revealed mounting public 
opposition to mandatory retirement based solely on age.21 Sec- 
18. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,578 (1978) (discussing roots and hybrid nature of 
ADEA-including reference to National Labor Relations Act). The prohibitions in 5 
4(a)(l)-(2) of the ADEA are taken "in haec verba" from 5 703(a)(l)-(2) of title VII of the 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584; compare 29 U.S.C. 5 
623(a)(1)-(2) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1976), but 5 7(b) of the ADEA ex- 
pressly provides that the Act is to be enforced in accordance with the "powers, remedies, 
and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 5 626(b) (1976) 
(incorporating 29 U.S.C. $8 211(b), 216(b)-(d), 217 (1976)). In addition to legal relief 
analogous to the FLSA, see Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 
n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 1022 (1977), 5 7(b) of the ADEA provides for equi- 
table relief with language similar to 706(g) of title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. 5 626(b) 
(1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
Judges have not been able to agree on the appropriate analogy in many cases. The 
analogy between 5 7(d) of the ADEA and 5 706(d) of title VII was the basis of a decision 
which was affirmed by an evenly divided court. See Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99 
(1977), aff'g, 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). Compare 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d) (1976) with 42 
U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976). Section 14(b) of the ADEA has been found to be virtually the 
same as 5 706(b) of title VII, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979); 
compare 29 U.S.C. 5 633(b) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(c) (1976), yet some judges 
believe that enforcement proceedings under the FLSA are the more appropriate analogy, 
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In another case, 
the majority opinion stated that # 706(b) of title VII was the basis for § 14(b) of the 
ADEA, Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974); compare 42 U.S.C. 5 
2000e-5(c) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 5 633(b) (1976), while the concurring opinion stated 
that 5 706(b) of title VII should instead be compared with 5 7(b) of the ADEA, 492 F.2d 
at 17 (Garth, J., concurring); compare 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(c) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. 5 
626(b) (1976)). 
19. See note 17 supra. 
20. Pub. L. No. 95-256,92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. $5 623,624,626,631,633a, 
634; 5 U.S.C. $5 8335, 8339 (1976)). 
21. See, e.g., Auocational and Employment Needs of Retired Persons: Hearings 
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Active Americans 
574 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
ondly, Congress seemed displeased with the federal judiciary for 
several ADEA interpretations that created large loopholes in the 
protection Congress intended to provide for the elderly? 
In response to both public sentiment and judicial interpre- 
tations, Congress enacted the 1978 Amendments, which raised 
the protected age limit for private sector employees from sixty- 
five to seventy years of age as of January 1, 1979.as In addition, 
mandatory retirement for most federal employees was abolished 
as of September 30, 1978.24 
Under the Amendments, colleges and universities retain the 
right to require the retirement of tenured faculty members at 
age sixty-five until July 1, 1982.'= Top-level executives or high 
policy-making employees in the private sector who have served 
in those positions for two years prior to retirement are exempted 
from the Act's additional five-year protection, provided they are 
entitled to an immediate, annual, unforfeitable retirement bene- 
fit equivalent to a straight-life annuity of $27,000.26 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
was assigned to conduct a study on the effects of the 1978 
Amendments on federal employees, and submit its report to the 
President and Congress no later than January 1, 1980.n The 
Over 65: A Case Against Mandatory Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select 
Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sem. (1977); Active Americans Over 65 Speak on Re- 
tirement Age Policies: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1977); Alternatives to Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. 
on Aging, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Retirement Age Policies: Hearings Before the 
House Select Comm. on Aging (pts. I & 11), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Retirement Age Policies]; Impact of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1976); Age & Sex Discrimination in Employment & Review of Federal Response to 
Employment Needs of the Elderly: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
22. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 9 5 ~ ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., 
REPORT ON MANDATORY ETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED I LE- 
NESS (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as MANDATORY ETIREMENT]. 
23. 29 U.S.C. 631(a) (Supp. 111 1979). 
24. Id. 633a(a). 
25. Id. $ 631(d). 
26. Id. § 631(c). 
27. Id. 633a(g). The responsibility of undertaking a study and submitting a report 
to the President and Congress was originally assigned to the Civil Service Commission. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5(g), 
92 Stat. 192. This responsibility was later assigned to the Equal Employment Opportu- 
nity Commission pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978,s 2,3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compila- 
tion), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at  354 (Supp. 111 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979), 
effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1978 
Compilation). 
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Secretary of Labor was directed to conduct a similar study fo- 
cusing on the feasibility of raising the age protection above sev- 
enty years of age for private sector employees. Special attention 
was to be directed to the bona fide executive and tenured faculty 
exemptions. An interim report from the Secretary of Labor was 
due January 1, 1981, and the final report is to be submitted to 
the President and Congress by January 1, 1982? 
The amended ADEA prohibits pension plans or seniority 
systems from requiring the mandatory retirement of employees 
protected under the Act. However, the effective date of the pro- 
hibition was delayed with respect to employee benefit plans or 
seniority systems included in collective bargaining agreements. 
The effective date in such cases was January 1, 1980, or the ex- 
piration of the contract, whichever occurred first.2s 
The 1978 Amendments dealt with certain procedural issues 
as well. Age discrimination claimants were given a right to a jury 
trial on any issue of fact in actions seeking recovery of back pay, 
liquidated damages, or other amounts owing as a result of a vio- 
lation of the ADEA?O 
The 1978 Amendments replaced the earlier "notice of intent 
to sue" with a "charge" requirement. The charge is to be filed 
with the EEOC and sets forth the identity of the potential de- 
fendant as well as describes the alleged discriminatory action. 
However, the charge requirement is not a jurisdictional prereq- 
uisite for bringing an action under the ADEA." 
The statute of limitations may be tolled for one year during 
conciliation conducted by the EEOC. The conciliation require- 
ment is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a cause of 
action under ADEA, but the courts may stay pending lawsuits in 
order to permit conciliation to be ~ornpleted.~~ 
11. MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
A. Public Opinion 
According to testimony presented in congressional hearings, 
28. 29 U.S.C. 5 624. 
29. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 
256, 5 2, 92 Stat. 189. 
30. 29 U.S.C. 626(~) (supp. m 1979). 
31. ~ d .  5 626(d). 
32. Id. 5 626(e). 
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the vast majority of Americans oppose mandatory retirement." 
A 1974 Harris Poll asked people over eighteen years of age 
whether they agreed with the statement: "Nobody should be 
forced to retire because of age if he wants to continue working 
and is stdl able to do a good job." The results were overwhelm- 
ing-eighty-six percent agreed, including seventy-nine percent 
of those age eighteen to sixty-four who are responsible for hiring 
and firing? 
This strong public sentiment against mandatory retirement 
appears quite justified in view of several commentators' conclu- 
sions that the traditional bases for mandatory retirement are 
proving to be myths." One in-depth study analyzed "the nine 
most frequently cited reasons justifying mandatory retirement'' 
and concluded that the traditional justifications must be dis- 
missed for a lack of substantiati~n.~~ Five of the cited reasons 
are disability related and allege that the elderly: (1) work less 
efficiently-and therefore are unable to maintain production 
standards; (2) experience an intellectual decline in old age; (3) 
show a decrease in stamina and strength which causes an inabil- 
ity to comply with employer safety requirements; (4) cannot ad- 
just to new work situations and new company policies and prac- 
tices due to inflexibility; and, (5) contract frequent illnesses 
resulting in absences from work." The remaining four grounds 
involve administrative dSculties that would supposedly arise if 
mandatory retirement was banned: (6) increased corporate in- 
surance costs; (7) the dficulty and costliness of administering 
"a selective retirement system on an individual basis;" (8) dis- 
couragement of new blood in the company; and, (9) fear that 
promotion openings would be diminished without mandatory re- 
tirement." The grounds enumerated that are capable of quanti- 
fiable verification not only lack substantiation but face statisti- 
33. H.R. REp. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). 
34. Id. 
35. See Note, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 Cm- 
KENT L. REV. 116,118-20 (1974) (section entitled "Myths That Support Mandatory Re- 
tirement") [hereinafter cited as Mandatory Retirement Myths]; Age Discrimination, 
supra note 5, at 1315-18 (section entitled "The Infirm Basis of Age Discrimination"); 
Note, Mandatory Retirement: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, 11 
WILLAMF~TE L.J. 398, 401-04 (1975) (section entitled "Mandatory Retirement: Fact and 
Fiction") [hereinafter cited as Broader Social Context]. 
36. Mandatory Retirement Myths, supra note 35, at 118-20. 
37. Id. at 118. 
38. Id. 
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cal evidence to the contrary.SB The more subjective grounds are 
considered by some to barely support a rational basis for 
mandatory retirernenti4O others think them to be unfounded." 
B. Government Employees 
Although not arising under the ADEA, the leading case 
dealing with mandatory retirement of government employees is 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement u. M u r g i ~ . ~ ~  In Murgia the 
Supreme Court rejected an equal protection attack against a 
state law requiring uniformed police officers to retire at age 
fifty? The Court applied a rational basis rather than a strict 
scrutiny standard since it determined that neither is government 
employment a fundamental right nor is age a suspect classifica- 
tion." The Court again applied the rationality standard in the 
non-ADEA case of Vance v. Bradley" to defeat an equal protec- 
tion challenge to the federal law requiring Foreign Service per- 
sonnel to retire at age sixty." 
39. MANDATORY RETIREMENT, supra note 22, a t  34-37, see generally sources cited 
note 35 supra. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Bradley v. Vance, 436 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1977), reu'd, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Eglit, An- 
other Name for Discrimination, CIV. LIB. REV., Fall 1974, at  87; Note, The Constitu- 
tional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 748 (1975); 
Note, Mandatory Retirement, 23 S.D. L. REV. 358 (1978). 
42. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
43. Id. at  312. 
44. Id. at  312-13. In applying the rational basis standard, the Court cited San 
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973), for precedent that strict scru- 
tiny of a legislative classification is necessary only "when the classification impermissibly 
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvan- 
tage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at  312 
(footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that government employment is 
not per se a fundamental right and that the class of uniformed officers over 50 years of 
age does not constitute a suspect class. 
The relative ease with which the Court reached its conclusion is surprising in light of 
some of the Court's earlier equal protection decisions in which irrebuttable presumptions 
were struck down in favor of individualized treatment under the rationality standard. 
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441 (1973). 
45. 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979). 
46. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 5 632 of 
the Foreign Service Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 1015 (current version a t  22 U.S.C. 1002 
(1976)), which requires that individuals covered by the Foreign Service retirement sys- 
tem retire-at age 60. 
As in Murgia, the Court in Bradley reversed the decision of a three-judge district 
court. However, in a significant expansion of the deference shown the legislature by the 
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The Supreme Court's reluctance to provide greater age pro- 
tection for federal employees as evidenced by Murgia and Brad- 
ley is at cross purposes with Congress' efforts to achieve greater 
protection for elderly federal employees. Congress, for example, 
in the 1974 amendments to the ADEA extended the Act's cover- 
age to most government employees and raised the age protection 
limit to seventy for federal civil service employees," five years 
higher than for private sector  employee^.^^ The 1978 Amend- 
ments went further, eliminating the seventy-year age limit and 
prohibiting the mandatory retirement of those federal employees 
covered by the ADEA.4@ The 1978 Amendments also provided 
protection for state and local government employees between 
the ages of sixty-five and seventy,'O but did not affect the estab- 
lished exceptions to ADEA coverage for hazardous federal jobs" 
and for certain foreign service pers~nnel .~~ 
C. Private Sector Employees 
Protection for private sector employees under the original 
ADEA terminated when the employees reached age sixty-five." 
Legislative reports reveal that the age sixty-five ceiling was cho- 
sen for the ADEA because social security benefits generally be- 
gin at that age? In turn, the Social Security Act of 1935 bor- 
rowed age sixty-five from "the Old Age and Survivors Pension 
Act which Otto von Bismarck pushed through as the first chan- 
cellor of the German Empire in 1889."SS During the debate pre- 
ceding the passage of the ADEA, some legislators attacked the 
Court in Murgia, the majority in Bradley placed a substantial burden upon plaintiffs 
who challenge the factual bases for legislative classifications. The plaintiff's burden in an 
equal protection case of this type is to "convince the court that the legislative facts on 
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true 
by the governmental decisionmaker." 440 U.S. at 111 (citations omitted). 
47. 29 U.S.C. 99 630(b), 63% (1976). 
48. It is estimated that the 1974 amendments brought 95% of the federal civilian 
work force under the ADEA. CCH, NEW 1978 MANDATORY RETIREMENT AND AGE DIS- 
CRIMINATION RULES 14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AGE DISCRIMINATION RULES (CCH)]. 
49. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
50. Id. 
51. 123 CONG. RBC. 29,002 (1977) (e.g., federal firefighters, law enforcement officials, 
and air traffic controllers). 
52. AGE DISCRIMMATION RULES (CCH), supra note 48, at 14. 
53. 29 U.S.C. 8 631 (1976) (amended 19'78). 
54. S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504,525. 
55. MANDATORY ETIREMENT, supra note 22, at 1. 
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setting of age sixty-five or any other age limit as arbitrary and 
unfounded since the life expectancy in Bismarck's time was half 
what it is today and advancements in medical science preserve 
the fitness and working capacity of many people beyond sixty- 
five years of age? 
Opponents of the "arbitrary" age sixty-five protection limit 
claimed partial victory with the 1978 Amendments when ADEA 
protection was expanded to include most private sector employ- 
ees from ages forty to seventy." Congress settled on the increase 
to age seventy as "a compromise between some who favor re- 
moving the age limit entirely, and others who are uncertain of 
the consequences of changing the present age sixty-five limit."" 
Age seventy proved to be a popular compromise figure since 
data was available from states such as New York showing that 
the work of employees ages sixty-five to seventy "was 'about 
equal to and sometimes noticeably better than younger 
workers.' "5@ 
D. Studies and Reports Required 
The 1978 Amendments foreshadow a possible removal of 
the age limit altogether for ADEA protection in the private see- 
tor within the next few years. The elimination of the seventy- 
year age limit for federal government employees is some evi- 
dence of congressional movement in that direction. An even 
more significant indication is the 1978 amendment requiring the 
Secretary of Labor to determine "the feasibility of raising such 
limitation above 70 years of age" and "the feasibility of elimi- 
nating such limitati~n."~~ 
In 1977 there were an estimated twenty-two million Ameri- 
cans over age sixty-fiveabout the same number as there were 
56. 113 CONC. REC. 31,256 (1967). 
57. 29 U.S.C. 5 631(a) (Supp. III 1979). The very limited exceptions to the extended 
coverage are discussed in text accompanying notes 79 to 98 infra. 
58. H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). 
59. S. REP. NO. 95-493,95th Cong., 1st Sesa. 3 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONC. & AD. NEWS 504, 506. See also id. 4-5, 7; Public Policy and the Future of Work 
and Retirement: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 131-34 (1978) (section entitled "The Potential Labor Market Impact of Prohibiting 
Mandatory Retirement Before Age 70") [hereinafter cited as Public Policy and the Fu- 
ture of Work and Retirement]. 
60. 29 U.S.C. 5 624 (Supp. III 1979) (interim report due Jan. 1, 1981; final report 
due Jan. 1, 1982). 
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blacks.61 The percentage of persons aged sixty-five and over in 
the U.S. has increased from 9.9% in 1970 to approximately 
11.2% in 1980 and is expected to increase to some 15.9% in 2020 
and 19.0% in 2030.62 Life expectancy has already increased from 
61.7 years in 1935, when the Social Security Act was passed, to 
72.5 years in 1976? It has beeh estimated that thirty-four per- 
cent of workers who reach retirement age "have both the ability 
and the desire to continue   or king."^ Other surveys reveal that 
"over half of those employees who are forcibly retired are bitter 
about it."66 
In making his report, the Secretary of Labor should con- 
sider the impact of mandatory retirement on the individual. For 
instance, mandatory retirement has been shown to cause mortal- 
ity rates to jump as much as thirty percent? Also, the American 
Medical Association has confirmed that " '[tlhe sudden cessation 
of productive work and earning power of an individual, caused 
by compulsory retirement, often leads to physical and emotional 
illness and premature death.' Mandatory retirement can have 
a significant psychological i m p a ~ t , ~  which in turn contributes to 
"such disorders as hypochondria, chronic fatigue states, neurotic 
depression and, primarily among business executives, alcohol- 
ism. The unmistakable signs of stress and anxiety are also re- 
flected by higher rates of suicide and functional mental illness in 
the over-65 p~pulation."~~ 
While "[pleople in lower socio-economic groups have been 
found to have only slightly poorer adjustment to retirement,"70 
mandatory retirement does create greater difficulties for the eld- 
erly poor. Persons age sixty-five and older comprise a dispropor- 
61. 123 CONG. REC. 29,005 (1977). 
62. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1979 at 29 (100th ed. 1979). Public Policy and the Future of Work and 
Retirement, supra note 59, at 116-17. 
63. 123 CONG. REC. 34,320 (1977). 
64. Mandatory Retirement Myths, supra note 35, at 117-18. 
65. Retirement Age Policies (pt. I ) ,  supra note 21, at 40. The significance of this 
figure is reduced by the concomitant finding that 39% of retirements are based on abil- 
ity, not age. Id. 
66. H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). 
67. S. REP. NO. 95-493,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 504,507. 
68. See Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement 
Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 155-58 (1971) (section entitled "Psychological Aspects of 
Retirement"). 
69. Age Discrimination, supra note 5, at  1323 (footnotes omitted). 
70. Id. at 1320. 
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tionately large share of Americans whose annual incomes are be- 
low the poverty level. The elderly poor are naturally more 
opposed to mandatory retirement than other older citizens. "In 
other words, those who want to work beyond 65 are most often 
those who need to work in order to maintain a minimal standard 
of living."71 Some legislators also feel that mandatory retirement 
is bankrupting the social security system and must be elimi- 
nated to save the system for the elderly who really need it." 
From an employer's perspective the Secretary of Labor 
should also investigate the validity of arguments contending that 
abolishing mandatory retirement would impose administrative 
and financial hardships on business.7s While some experts have 
predicted that abolishing mandatory retirement would boost the 
GNP and benefit business generally," the documented trend to- 
ward voluntary early retirement suggests that the impact on in- 
dividual employers of abolishing mandatory retirement may be 
only slight.76 "A recent Roper poll found that nearly two-thirds 
of Americans would like to retire before age 62, and over one- 
third prefer to retire before reaching 60."70 Furthermore, the 
great majority of those desiring to work beyond age sixty-five 
would prefer a part-time job." Congress is also willing to allow 
downward adjustments in pension plan benefits for workers who 
work beyond the "normal retirement" age." In short, in order to 
comply with the 1978 Amendments' mandate to determine the 
feasibility of abolishing mandatory retirement in the private sec- 
tor, the Secretary of Labor's reporbmust weigh the impact of 
71. S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. 
CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 504, 506, 507. See also, Retirement Age Policies (pt. I), supra 
note 21, at  12. 
72. MANDATORY ETIREMENT, supra note 22, at  47. See also, 123 CONC. REC. 29,007, 
30,555 (1977). 
73. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra (discussion of myths about the 
administrative convenience of mandatory retirement). 
74. S. REP. NO. 95-493,95th Cong., 1st Sees. 4 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 504,507; H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). 
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 3, 29 (1977). 
76. S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 32 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. 
CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 504,526. 
77. Public Policy and the Future of Work and Retirement, supra note 59, at  96. A 
survey showed: prefer not to work = 28%; prefer to work part-time = 48.4%; prefer to 
work full-time = 5.4%; not sure = 18.2%. Id. 
78. See 124 CONG. RBc. S4,450 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1978); S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 504,517- 
19. Regulations setting forth the guidelines for such adjustments are found a t  29 C.F.R. g 
860.120 (1980). 
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mandatory retirement on employees' physical, psychological, 
and economic welfare against employers' possible administrative 
and financial hardships. 
A. Congress and Supreme Court Disagree 
Congress' movement away from mandatory retirement was 
substantially hindered by judicial interpretations of the excep- 
tion to ADEA coverage carved out for retirement and pension 
plans." Section 4(f) of the ADEA as originally enacted provided: 
I t  shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to observe 
the terms of a . . . bona fide benefit employee plan such as a 
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter- 
fuge to evade the purposes of this [Act].80 
Because the language of this provision is susceptible to more 
than one interpretation, a split emerged in the circuits concern- 
ing whether a retirement or pension plan that imposed 
mandatory retirement based solely on age was a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of the ADEA. On the one side, the Fourth 
Circuit8' relied upon the Act's legislative history to find that the 
exception was intended to allow age discrimination only with re- 
spect to the benefits paid under certain plans. Presumably Con- 
gress felt that this narrow exception would overcome employers' 
hesitancy to hire older workers who might demand full pension 
benefits even though they may work only a few years.82 The Sec- 
retary of Labor's interpretation of the statute supported the 
Fourth Circuit's position. On the other side, the Second, Third, 
and Fifth Circuits, along with district courts in the Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits, construed the 
exception more broadly to permit the involuntary retirement of 
older employees before age sixty-five pursuant to the terms of a 
pension or retirement plan.- 
79. See H.R. Rm. NO. 95-527 (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). 
80. 29 U.S.C. 623(f)' (1976). The section also affords exceptions for discharges for 
cause or discrimination based on a bona fide occupational qualification. 
81. McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), reu'd, 434 U.S. 
192 (1977). 
82. 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, re- 
printed in [I9671 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2217. 
83. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 
(1977); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); McKinley v. 
Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Bradley v. Kissinger, 418 F. Supp. 64 
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In United Air Lines v. M ~ M a n n , ~  the Supreme Court re- 
jected the Fourth Circuit's position and instead adopted the 
broad interpretation of the exception. In doing so, the Supreme 
Court relied principally upon the ordinary meaning of section 
4(f)'s language and only cursorily examined the legislative his- 
tory.8s The Court also held that a bona fide plan established 
before the passage of the Act in 1967 could not be a subterfuge 
to evade the Finally, the Court rejected any "per se rule 
requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose 
in order to satisfy the subterfuge language of the Act."87 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, 
massaged the legislative history more rigorously than the major- 
ity did and reached a contrary ~onclusion. The dissent argued 
that the majority violated principles of statutory ~onstruction~~ 
and misconstrued congressional intent8@ by adopting a broad in- 
(D.D.C. 1976); Dunlop v. Hawaii Telephone Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976); De 
Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 355 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 49 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Kincaid v. United Steelworkers of Am., 5 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. 7258 (N.D. Ind. 1972). 
84. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
85. Id. at 199-202. 
86. Id. at 203. The Court did not discuss the exact language of the exception, how- 
ever, which does not allow a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 
87. Id. 
88. The majority did examine the ADEA's legislative history, 434 U.S. at 199-202, 
but clearly felt that the plain language of the statute supported its position. After noting 
the dissent's heavy reliance upon the legislative history, the Court observed that under 
traditional canons of interpretation resort to legislative history is "irrelevant" where an 
unambiguous statute exists. Id. at 199. 
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, disputed the correctness of the majority's 
plain meaning interpretation. He stated: 
The opinion of the Court assumes that this language is clear on its face. 
Ante, at 199. I cannot agree with this premise. In my view, the statutory lan- 
guage is susceptible of at least two interpretations, and the only reading conso- 
nant with congressional intent would preclude involuntary retirement of em- 
ployees covered by the Act. 
Id. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
89. Both the majority and the dissent believed that they correctly followed congres- 
sional intent in reaching their respective conclusions. Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the majority, stated: 
Giving meaning to each of these provisions leads inescapably to the con- 
clusion they were intended to permit observance of the mandatory retirement 
terms of bona fide retirement plans, but that the existence of such plans could 
not be used as an excuse not to hire any person because of age. 
U.S. at 201-02. 
Justice Marshall wrote in defense of the dissent's interpretation: 
To construe the 5 4(f)(2) exemption broadly to authorize involuntary retire- 
ment when no statement in the Committee Reports or by the Act's floor man- 
agers or sponsors in the debates supports that interpretation flouts this funda- 
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terpretation of the exception. While McMann was under consid- 
eration by the Court, the amendment machinery was already op- 
erating to clarify the statute's legislative intent by adopting the 
interpretation the dissent followed. Indeed, " [tlhe mischief the 
Court fashions today may be short-lived."a0 
The 1978 Amendments to the ADEA added the following 
clarification to section 4(f)(2): "and no such seniority system or 
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re- 
tirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this ti- 
tle because of the age of such individual."@l The Conference Re- 
port accompanying the 1978 Amendments emphasizes that the 
Supreme Court had misconstrued the exception in McMann: 
The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to 
section 4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear one of the original 
purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not 
authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary retire- 
ment of an employee within the protected age group on ac- 
count of age. 
In McMann . . ., the Supreme Court held to the con- 
trary. . . . The conferees specifically disagree with the Su- 
preme Court's holding and reasoning in that case. Plan provi- 
sions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt 
under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate 
the act or these amendments.- 
Congress was compelled to make this clarification and reverse 
the effect of McMann for the increased age limit to seventy 
years to have any real meaningB8 since over ninety percent of the 
pension plans in the private sector designate sixty-five as the age 
for retirement? 
mental principle of construction [remedial statutes should be liberally 
interpreted]. 
. . . But the Committee Reports of both Houses make plain that, properly 
understood, the existing Act already prohibits involuntary retirement, and that 
the amendment [one of the 1978 Amendments] is only a clarification necessi- 
tated by court decisions misconstruing congressional intent [citations omitted]. 
434 U.S. at  218 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
90. 434 U.S. at 218 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
91. 29 U.S.C. g 623(0(2) (supp. m 1979). 
92. H.R. REp. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 529. 
93. H.R. REP. NO. 95-52?? (pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). 
94. Broader Social Context, supra note 35, at  400. See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-527 
(pt. I), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977); MANDATORY RETIREMENT, supra note 22, at  2. 
5691 AGE DISCRIMINATION 585 
B. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Remains 
Unchanged 
Since Congress has plugged the section 4(f)(2) pension plan 
loophole, employers will likely turn to section 4(f)(l), the bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to ADEA pro- 
tection, which was left untouched by the 1978 Amendments. 
Early cases involving the BFOQ exception dealt with age dis- 
crimination in hiring,@' yet more recently such actions have been 
brought in a termination   on text.^ The three courts of appeals 
that have considered the application of the BFOQ exception 
under the ADEA have fashioned two different approaches, yield- 
ing different results.97 The two approaches that have emerged 
95. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 
(1974); Aldendifer v. Continental Air Lines, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090 (D. Cal. 1978). 
96. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 420 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1976), re- 
manded on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1010 (1978). 
97. In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1122 (1975), the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant bus company's maxi- 
mum hiring age of 35 for intercity bus drivers. The court reasoned that when public 
safety is involved, employers owing a duty of safety to the public have a minimal burden 
in proving a rational basis for the discriminatory hiring practice. 
The Fifth Circuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 
1976), also considered an unsuccessful applicant's attack against a maximum hiring age 
of 40 for intercity bus drivers. In addition to requiring that the employer show that its 
job qualifications were "reasonably necessary" to achieve public safety-the Hodgson 
standard-the Fifth Circuit further required that the employer show that job applicants 
over a certain age were incapable of meeting its job qualifications. Id. at  235-36. The 
defendant employer in Tamiami prevailed because the court of appeals upheld the dis- 
trict court's finding that no effective and reliable individual testing procedure existed to 
verify older applicants' compliance with safety standards. Id. at 238. 
Contrary to the outcome in Tamiami and Hodgson, the Eighth Circuit in Houghton 
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), 
though following the Tamiami line of analysis, refused to grant the defendant employer 
a BFOQ exemption. In Houghton, the employee test pilot contested his employer's re- 
duction of its pilot staff on the basis of the age of the pilots. While conceding the ab- 
sence of a functional individual testing procedure, the court held that the employer had 
failed to meet its burden of establishing a factual basis showing that all, or substantially 
all, older pilots were incapable of performing test pilot duties safely. Id. at  564. The 
employer's failure to meet its burden proved determinative in light of the employee's 
impressive array of evidence to the effect that safety risks attributable to aging among 
professional pilots are minuscule. Id. The result in Houghton may also be distinguished 
from Hodgson and Tamiami in that it was a termination action while the latter were 
hiring cases. 
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Hodgson and Houghton, it is 
uncertain what standard of review the Supreme Court will eventually apply in BFOQ 
cases-the less exacting standard of Hodgson or the stricter standard of Tamiami and 
Houghton. 
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from these three cases have been critici~ed,@~ and this particular 
conflict among the circuits appears ripe for consideration in the 
Supreme Court. 
IV. JURY TRIAL 
A. Congress & Supreme Court Agree 
The original ADEA section 7(c) provided that "[alny person 
aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent ju- 
risdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the 
purposes of this [Act]."@@ Courts split over the question of 
whether the statute's language guaranteed a right to a jury trial, 
as in FLSA actions, or denied a jury trial, as in title VII actions. 
The Third and Fourth Circuits and district courts in the Sev- 
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits decided that the parties in an 
ADEA action are entitled to a jury,loO while the Sixth Circuit 
and district courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits held that 
the right to a jury trial does not exist.lol 
The question of the right to a jury trial in an ADEA action 
brought against a private party was finally resolved in Lorillard 
v. Pons.loP In Lorillard, a unanimous Supreme Court held that 
ADEA's provision assuring "legal or equitable relief' means the 
right to a jury trial.loS The 1978 amendments incorporated the 
Lorillard holding by stating: "[A] person shall be entitled to a 
trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery 
of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter 
. . . ."IM It should also be noted that although it was the em- 
ployee who requested the jury in Lorillard, the decision granting 
the claimant such a right does not necessarily indicate a pro- 
98. Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment-The Bona Fide Occupational 
Defense-Balancing the Interest of the OMer Worker in Acquiring and Continuing Em- 
ployment Against the Interest in Public Safety, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1339,1354-61 (1978). 
99. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976). 
100. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1022 (1977); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 
(1978); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Bertrand v. Orkin 
Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), a f d  on rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 
952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 
101. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976); Travers v. Corning Glass 
Works, 76 F.R.D. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); PolstorB v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ala. 
1977). 
102. 434 U.S. 575 (1978). 
103. Id. at  584-85. See also Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977). 
104. 29 U.S.C. g 626(~)(2) (supp. m 1979). 
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elderly opinion. In title VII actions, for example, the denial of a 
jury trial can be considered prodiscriminatee because it prevents 
an employer from rehearsing before a jury the damaging effects 
and losses suffered because of a plaintiffs incompetence. Fre- 
quently, juries are more sympathetic toward the employer's 
cause than the plaintiffs plight. Age discrimination claimants 
may run the same risk. 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the ques- 
tion of whether claimants bringing age discrimination suits 
against the federal government are entitled to a jury trial, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit has ruled that they do.lo6 
B. Available Damages Unchanged 
Congress bypassed the opportunity in the 1978 amendments 
to explicitly delineate the types of damages available for ADEA 
violations. Liquidated damages have been allowed in "cases of 
willful violations" since the ADEA's inception,lM but the Act is 
silent with regard to punitive damages and damages for pain 
and suffering. The Conference Report accompanying the 1978 
amendments does state that punitive damages should not be 
available.lo7 Most courts agree1" with one exception.10@ 
105. Nakshian v. Claytor, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,455 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Nakshian, 
a 62-year-old civilian employee brought an age discrimination suit against the United 
States Department of the Navy and demanded a jury trial. The Government opposed the 
jury demand on the ground that because Congress in authorizing ADEA actions did not 
specifically authorize jury trials, they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the sovereign immunity argument by obaerv- 
ing that Congress waived the Government's sovereign immunity when it authorized 
ADEA suits to be brought against the government, even though it did not specify what 
trial procedure was to be used in such cases. Id. at  14,458. 
The court of appeals also referred to the district court's opinion where it was noted 
that the phrase "legal relief," which had been a key point of the Supreme Court's reason- 
ing in Lorillard, was also used in ADEA's provision regarding federal employees (29 
U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976)). Moreover, the court of appeals' own review of the statute and 
its legislative history persuaded it to accept the "inference that Congress intended to 
provide for jury trials in ADEA actions against the Government." 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. a t  
14,458. 
106. 29 U.S.C. 8 626(b) (1976). 
107. H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 535. 
108. Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 570 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1066 (1977); Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298,300-04 (D. Conn. 
1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 945,946-49 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddle v. 
Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Fellows v. 
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The Conference Report made no reference to damages for 
pain and suffering.l1° With no definitive direction from either 
Congress or the Supreme Court, the current status of the law 
concerning damages for pain and suffering is unsettled. Most 
courts that have addressed the question have referred to dam- 
ages for pain and suffering as compensatory damages. The ma- 
jority position is represented by the First, Third, Fourth, and 
Fifth Circuits and district courts in the Second, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits, which have held that compensatory damages 
for pain and suffering are not available.ll1 The opposite posi- 
tion-permitting recovery of damages for pain and suffer- 
ing-has been initially taken by some district courts, only to be 
reversed in most instances by the courts of appeals."' The Sev- 
enth"' and Tenth114 Circuits have district courts holding both 
Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199,202 (D. Or. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assur- 
ance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 
427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 
(E.D. Pa. 1976). 
109. Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-11 (D. 
Colo. 1978). The Kennedy holding has been questioned by a sister district court of the 
same circuit in Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (D. 
Okla. 1978). 
Two district courts that originally permitted recovery of punitive damages were sub- 
sequently reversed. See yalker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730,*731 (D.S.C. 1977), 
rev'd, 605 F.2d 128,129-30 (4th Cir. 1979); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 
F. Supp. 1403, 1405-06 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd in part, reu'd and remanded in part per 
curium, 570 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978). 
110. The phrase "damages for pain and suffering" is used here to include closely 
allied damages such as psychological, psychic, and mental or emotional distress damages. 
This generic grouping is necessary since some courts do not draw precise distinctions. 
111. Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292,1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez 
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security 
Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036,1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rog- 
ers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834,839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1022 (1978); Catlett v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 358, 365-67 (W.D. Mo. 
1978); Ellis v. Philippine Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Postemski v. 
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corp., 443 F. Supp. 101, 103 (D. Conn. 1977); Looney v. Com- 
mercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 535-37 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Travers v. 
Coming Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rechsteiner v. Madison 
Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499, 501 (D. Del. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 
1329, 1335-38 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 
1976). 
112. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 605 
F.2d 128,129-30 (4th Cir. 1979); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 
663-64 (W.D. Va. 1977); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 
1404-06 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part per curiam, 570 F.2d 
1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978). 
113. Compare Morton v. Sheboygan Memorial Hosp., 458 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. 
Wis. 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706,713-14 (E.D. Wis. 1978), and 
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ways. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two cases dis- 
allowing damages for pain and suffering.ll5 Moreover, some au- 
thorities infer from the 1978 amendments' Conference Report 
that congressional intent agrees with the majority of courts that 
damages for pain and suffering in ADEA actions should be 
denied. l6 
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies 
The ADEA provides that "no suit may be brought" under 
the Act until sixty days after state proceedings have been com- 
menced if the alleged age discrimination occurred in a state 
which prohibits such discrimination and has an enforcement 
mechanism.l17 Forty-one states plus the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico now have laws prohibiting age discrimination in 
Hence, the question whether exhaustion of state 
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1132-33 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd 
on rehearing, 432 F.  Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (these three cases allowed recovery of 
compensatory damages), with Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442 F. Supp. 1270, 
1272-73 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (disallowing recovery of damages). 
114. Compare Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 
1009-11 (D. Colo. 1978), and Combes v. Griftin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. 
Okla. 1976) (these two cases allowed recovery of compensatory damages), with Riddle v. 
Getty Ref. & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978) (disallowing recovery of 
damages). 
115. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 
839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). 
116. See, e.g., Riddle v. Getty Ref. & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678, 679-80 (N.D. 
Okla. 1978); 29 S.C.L. REV. 705, 715 (1978). 
But see Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47,51-68 (1976) (pre-Conference Report arguments that com- 
pensatory damages for pain and suffering should be allowed). 
117. 29 U.S.C. 3 633(b) (1976). Expressly, the ADEA does not preempt state regula- 
tion, id. $ 633(a), and state acts can properly provide broader protection than the mini- 
mum standards of the ADEA, Simpson v. Alaska State Comm. for Human Rights, 423 F. 
Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976). See generally Comment, The 1%7 Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act and Preemption: A Case for Broader State Laws, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 
283 (1978). 
118. AGE DISCRIMINATION RULES (CCH), supra note 48, a t  33-42. Nine states have no 
law against age discrimination in employment (~labama, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming); four states protect only very 
limited groups of employees (Arizona, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota); 
fifteen states and the District of Columbia protect the elderly to a specified age but have 
a McMann-type exception (Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ne- 
braska, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washing- 
ton, and Wisconsin); six states and Puerto Rico protect the elderly to a specified age 
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remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an ADEA action was 
one of general concern. Because of the considerable controversy 
among the circuits, the Supreme Court recently resolved the 
question in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans.llQ In Evans a termi- 
nated employee had filed a notice of intent to sue with the De- 
partment of Labor, which in turn erroneously advised the plain- 
tiff that he need not file a state complaint. By failing to do so, 
plaintiff violated section 14(b) of the ADEA.lm Concluding that 
section 14(b) was patterned after section 706(b) of title VII,"' 
which requires initial resort to state proceedings, a unanimous 
Court held that resort to state remedies in ADEA actions is also 
mandatory before federal relief is ~ 0 u g h t . l ~ ~  Concerning the sec- 
ond aspect of the Court's holding, a divided Court ruled that the 
plaintiffs cause of action was not defeated for failure to comply 
with the state's statute of 1imitati0ns.l~~ 
(Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia); nine states 
have no age limit on age discrimination protection but have a McMann-type exception 
(Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and New Mex- 
ico); and seven states simply prohibit any age discrimination in employment (Alaska, 
California, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, and North Carolina). 
119. 441 U.S. 750 (1979). 
120. Id. at 754. 
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). The pertinent 
language of 8 706(b) states: 
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a 
State, . . . which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment 
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to 
grant or seek relief from such practice . . ., no charge may be filed . . . by the 
person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have 
been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have 
been earlier terminated. 
Id. 
122. It may be argued that the Court's decision to compel initial resort to state rem- 
edies was in part motivated by a desire to reduce the federal caseload. See sources cited 
note 147 infra. 
123. In a five-to-four decision on this point, the majority interpreted the language of 
§ 14(b) to only preclude the filing of a federal action until 60 days after state proceedings 
have been commenced. 441 U.S. at 759. The majority justified its construction of the 
statute on two grounds: (1) it aids laymen, who, unassisted by counsel, initiate the filing 
process, and (2) it fulfills the statute's purpose of granting "state agencies a limited op- 
portunity to settle grievances of ADEA claimants in a voluntary and localized manner so 
that the grievants thereafter have no need or desire for independent federal relief." Id. at  
761. 
Justice Stevens on the other hand, writing for the four member dissent, criticized 
the majority for "volunteer[ing] some detailed legal advice about the effect of a sug- 
gested course of conduct that respondent may now pursue and then order[ing] that his 
suit be held in abeyance while he follows that advice." Id. at 767 (Stevens, J., dissent- 
ing). The question of whether the respondent would be entitled to relief in federal court 
if his complaint were found to be time-barred by state law, reasoned Justice Stevens, 
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The Court's decision in Evans was in marked contrast to 
the Senate Report regarding the 1978 Amendments, which states 
"that an individual who has been discriminated against because 
of age is free to proceed either under state law or under federal 
law. The choice is up to the individual."12* In other words, the 
sixty days restriction was not intended to be jurisdictional, 
rather it was intended to "give the State the prescribed mini- 
mum period in which to take remedial action" if a person 
elected to apply first to a state agency for relief.12' However, 
since the 1978 Amendments did not reenact the section in ques- 
tion, the lower federal courts in addition to the Supreme Court 
have felt free to disregard the congressional comments.12' 
B. 180-Day Charge 
Section 8(d) of the original ADEA provided that no civil ac- 
tion could be brought under the Act until the Secretary of Labor 
had received notice of intent to sue within 180 days "after the 
alleged unlawful practice occurred."127 Controversy has arisen 
regarding when the time period begins to run"' and what consti- 
tutes adequate notice,ln but the most significant issue has been 
whether the requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite or 
whether it is subject to tolling on equitable grounds.1s0 The 1978 
Amendments relaxed the standard for what constitutes adequate 
notice to the Secretary of Labor from "notice of an intent to file 
such an action" to filing "a charge alleging unlawful discrimina- 
would be appropriately raised only after the respondent had pursued his state court rem- 
edies. To rule otherwise would be to render an advisory opinion on the merits of his 
claim. Id. 
124. S. REP. NO. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in [I9781 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 510. 
125. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
126. See, e.g., Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 459 F. Supp. 829, 831-32 (D. Mass. 1978). 
127. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d)(1) (1976). 
128. Compare Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975), and 
Marshall v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5097 (N.D. Ga. 1977), with Bon- 
ham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Payne v. Crane Co., 560 F.2d 
198 (5th Cir. 1977), and Davis v. RJR Foods, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
129. Compare Noto v. JFD Elec. Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1044 (E.D.N.C. 
1978); Sutherland v. SKI? Indus., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and Woodford 
v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973), with Enos v. Kaiser Indus. 
Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978); Berry v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1976), and Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1564 
(E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
130. See generally Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 459-74 (1977). 
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tion" with the EEOC.lS1 On the more controversial issue the 
1978 Conference Report stated, "The conferees agree that the 
'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to main- 
taining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable 
modification for failing to file within the time period will be 
available to plaintiffs under this Act."'" 
The circuits are evenly split concerning whether the 180-day 
charge requirement is jurisdictional. The Third Circuit and dis- 
trict courts in the First and Second Circuits have held that the 
180-day charge is not jurisdictional.lSs Contrary holdings are 
found in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and in district courts in 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.18( The Tenth Circuit and district 
courts in the District of Columbia and Third Circuits have held 
both ways.'" The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Shell Oil 
Co. v. Dartt,ls8 a pre-1978 Amendments case, to resolve the con- 
-- 
131. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(d) (Supp. I11 1979). "[Tlhe conferees intend that the 'charge' 
requirement will be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which identifies the 
potential defendant and generally describes the action believed to be diacriminatory." 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 528, 533-34. 
Pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 8 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), re- 
printed in 5 U.S.C. app., at  354 (Supp. I11 1979) a d  in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979), most of the 
functions relating to age discrimination administration and enforcement that had origi- 
nally been vested in the Secretary of Labor and the Civil Service Commission were 
transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, effective Jan. 1,1979, as 
provided by Exec. Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1978 Compilation). Accordingly, the 
charge requirement is filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONC. & AD. NEWS 528, 533-34. 
133. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Jackson v. Alcan 
Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Franci v. Avco Corp., 460 F. Supp. 389 
(D. Conn. 1978); Postemski v. Pratt Whitney Aircraft, 443 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1977); 
Abbott v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.H. 1977); Skoglund v. 
Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975). 
134. Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Ott v. Midland-Roes 
Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. G.E. Corp., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); 
Woodburn v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Edwards v. Kaiser 
Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, rehearing denied, 498 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Emerson 
Elec. Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 216 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Raper  v. Greater Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Oshiro v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 378 F. 
Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974). 
135. Compare Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an 
equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Mazzare v. Burroughs Corp., 473 F. Supp. 234 
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F. Supp. 505 
(E.D. Pa. 1978), and Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974), with Law 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Bengochea v. Norcross, Inc., 464 
F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1979), a d  Gebhard v. G.A.F. Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973). 
136. 434 U.S. 99, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1977), aff'g 539 F.2d 1256 (10th 
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flict but did nothing more than affirm without opinion "by an 
equally divided Court"lS7 the lower court's conclusion that the 
180 days is not jurisdictional. Thus, the Supreme Court is only 
tentatively aligned with congressional intent expressed in com- 
ments to the 1978 Amendments that the 180-day requirement be 
susceptible to modification on equitable grounds. 
C. Conciliation by Federal Agency 
The primary reason for the 180-day charge requirement is 
to afford the EEOC an opportunity to encourage conciliation 
and settlement of the dispute before it proceeds to trial. Some 
courts have been willing to stay an ADEA proceeding in order to 
make conciliation more meaningful.lM The 1978 Amendments 
sought to accomplish the same result by making a one-year toll- 
ing of the statute of limitations available "[while] the Commis- 
sion [EEOC] is attempting to effect voluntary compliance with 
requirements of [the ADEA] through informal methods of con- 
ciliation, conference, and persuasion."1sB 
The Conference Report accompanying the 1978 Amend- 
ments stated "that conciliation is not a jurisdictional prerequi- 
site to maintaining a cause of action under the act."140 The 
Eighth Circuit and a district court in the Fourth Circuit agree 
with that interpretation,141 but district courts in the Fifth, Sixth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that conciliation by the fed- 
eral agency is jurisdictional.14Vhe issue has never reached the 
Supreme Court, and the decision in D ~ r t t " ~  is too tenuous to 
Cir. 1976). 
137. Id. (Stewart, J. did not participate). 
138. See, e.g., Brennan v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1724 
(E.D. Ky. 1976); Dunlop v. Sandia Corp., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 128 (D.N.M. 1975). 
See also Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (recognizing the 
court's power to stay ADEA proceedings). 
139. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(c) (Supp. 111 1979). 
140. H.R. REP. NO. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 534. 
141. Brennan v. Ace Hardware, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Newburg 
R-2 School Dist., 469 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 
Co., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978); Brennan v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 1724 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (action stayed); Dunlop v. Sandia Corp., 13 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 128 (D.N.M. 1975) (action stayed). 
142. Vasquez v. City of Reno, 461 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Nev. 1978); Usery v. Sun Oil 
Co. (Delaware), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop v. Resource Sciences Corp., 
410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974). 
143. 434 U.S. 99 (1977), aff'g 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). 
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apply by analogy. Perhaps the strongest factor in favor of the 
nonjurisdictional view of conciliation is that the 1978 Amend- 
ments addressed that specific section of the ADEA and congres- 
sional comment should, therefore, be persuasive evidence of leg- 
islative intent.144 
VI. RESOLVING THE TENSION 
The tension between Congress and the courts regarding 
ADEA issues is not incurable. The concept of protection against 
age discrimination in employment has been discussed on a na- 
tional level for nearly twenty years and has been codified for the 
last fourteen years.14s During that time research has generated 
voluminous studies and statistical data which have been com- 
piled and digested to shape current policy. This extended gesta- 
tion period coupled with the ongoing studies should convince the 
courts that Congress' persistent movement toward greater pro- 
tection of the elderly is prudent and sound. For these reasons, 
the time has arrived for Congress and the courts to pull 
together. 
Both the federal courts and Congress must bear some of the 
blame for significant differences of opinion that have arisen with 
respect to many of the major ADEA issues. The federal judici- 
ary's, and most notably the Supreme Court's, lack of deference 
to the clear movement in Congress to provide greater employ- 
ment protection for the elderly may involve more than a simple 
lack of sensitivity to the pr0b1em.l~~ The narrow interpretations 
of the ADEA and particularly the establishment of certain "ju- 
risdictional" requirements could be just another manifestation 
of the federal judiciary's trend to contract jurisdictional bounda- 
ries in order to relieve an overloaded federal docket."' The judi- 
ciary also has cause to complain that Congress should be more 
144. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION $9 48.02-.16 (4th ed. 
1972). 
145. See text accompanying notes 2 to 6 supra. 
146. In contrast to some members of the federal judiciary, many state judges have 
been quick to condemn mandatory retirement, especially when the issue has applied to 
them personally. See Calvert, Mandatory Retirement of Judges, 54 JUD. 424 (1971); Fed- 
eral Courts Uphold Differing Retirement Rules, 59 JUD. 304 (1976); New York Civil 
Judges Attack Mandatory Retirement, 58 JUD. 304 (1975); Mandatory Retirement of 
Judges Upheld in Massachusetts, 56 JUD. 260 (1973). 
147. See Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal 
Courts out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977); 
Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REV. 33 (1978). 
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consistent and explicit in formulating its employment protection 
policies for the elderly, especially since Congress has enacted a 
hybrid ADEA composed of bits and pieces of other acts.14' 
Since Congress undoubtedly had the constitutional power to 
incorporate a more comprehensive and exact expression of in- 
tent in the ADEA and in the 1978 Amendments, there must be 
reasons why it did not. First is the political reality of compro- 
mise. In order to obtain the necessary votes and satisfy compet- 
ing interests, the sponsors must frequently substitute diluted 
language, thereby muddling the clarity of intent. Also, it is not 
uncommon for Congress to issue its legislative mandates in gen- 
eral terms so as to afford administrative agencies broad discre- 
tion in implementing congressional directives."@ Desirable flex- 
ibility and innovative license are lost as congressional specificity 
increases. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect an overloaded 
Congress to hammer out the minute details of each measure it 
passes. The adversarial system can sharpen the issues if litiga- 
tion does result, and permit a case-by-case treatment of delicate 
problems. This in turn allows courts and the inertia of the status 
quo to filter out faddish or ill-conceived movements spawned by 
broad-sweeping concerns so that only reform of sound merit sur- 
vives. And finally, Congress' method of dealing with employment 
discrimination against the elderly may be intentionally piece- 
meal so as to approach, rather than reach beyond, the necessary 
degree of specific regulation and control.lW 
The factors favoring more explicit enactment of legislative 
intent vary in their degree of importance. Congressional man- 
dates regarding the ADEA issues over which courts have dis- 
agreed should reduce litigation costs and conserve scarce judicial 
resources. Greater specificity by Congress ensures the retention 
148. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. 
149. The ADEA specifically provides in relevant part: 
[Tlhe Secretary of Labor may issue such rules and regulations as he may con- 
sider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter, and may establish 
such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all provisions of this chapter as 
he may find necessary and proper in the public interest. 
29 U.S.C. g 628 (1976). But see note 151 infra. 
150. The current popularity of deregulation acts indicates that Congress is aware of 
and desires to avoid overregulation. Two recent examples include the Airline De- 
regulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 and the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 142. See also S. 1400,96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979) (proposal to deregulate the trucking industry); Economic Regulation of 
the Trucking Industry: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Tramportation (pt. 2), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
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of policy decisionmaking power in the legislature-a body re- 
sponsive to the political process-rather than delegating imple- 
mentation to the burgeoning administrative bureaucracy.1s1 
Also, the time for implementing needed social reform is has- 
tened when congressional intent is unequivocal. Most important, 
enactment of a more explicit legislative mandate improves the 
chances that the courts will uphold congressional intent regard- 
ing the ADEA. 
Despite the obstacles, the most workable resolution of the 
tension would be for Congress to clarify its intent by enacting 
the substance of its comments by further amendment to the 
ADEA. The alternative of the federal judiciary giving credence 
to the legislative history and comments of the amended ADEA 
is unlikely to occur inasmuch as the courts seem to insist on in- 
terpreting the ADEA by reference to analogous legislative acts 
instead.lS2 Therefore, Congress must provide the necessary spec- 
ificity itself. Under such circumstances it would be much more 
difficult for federal courts to frustrate Congress' intent and the 
tension could be cured-resolved in favor of the working elderly. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Full and rapid achievement of the ADEA's principal pur- 
pose of providing greater protection to the elderly against em- 
ployment discrimination has been hindered because of the Su- 
preme Court's and some federal courts' failure to recognize or 
follow expressed congressional intent, thereby creating a tension 
between Congress and the federal judiciary over questions of age 
discrimination. The 1978 Amendments represent another step 
forward by Congress to clarify its original intent and to extend 
greater protection against age discrimination. Controversy re- 
mains, however, with respect to damages for pain and suffering, 
bona fide occupational qualification exceptions, and the 
mandatory retirement of state and local government employees. 
In addition, Congress must still determine whether even greater 
protection will be afforded to the elderly. 
151. Only meager interpretative regulations for the ADEA were issued by the Secre- 
tary of Labor. See 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1979). Shortly after enactment of the 1978 Amend- 
ments, administration of the ADEA was transferred to the EEOC. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 
of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 354 (Supp. 
I11 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1979). 
152. See, e.g., Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 459 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1978) (knowingly 
ignores Congress' explanation that exhaustion of state remedies is not jurisdictional). 
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Several proposals for further amendment of the ADEA are 
currently under intensive review, and findings were being trans- 
mitted by the Secretary of Labor to the President and Congress 
by January 1,1981 in an interim report and by January 1, 1982 
in final form. Once these reports are received, a solid basis 
should exist for the next Congress to confidently amend the 
ADEA. Hopefully, Congress will have learned by frustrating ex- 
perience that its intent and the substance of its comments need 
to be expressly enacted in the ADEA by amendment. Then Con- 
gress together with the courts can attain what the 1978 Arnend- 
ments presage-more complete protection against age discrimi- 
nation in employment. 
John A. Adams 
Jay D. Pimentel 
